In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of Ph110

December 17, 2004

If one were looking for unity, for harmony, for oneness in the multifarious multitude, one would expect to find it in similitude, on the flocking together of feather-sharing birds. I found it in my computer, trying desperately to say "Philosophy:"

01010000 01101000 01101001 01101100 01101111 01110011 01101111 01110000 01101000 01111001

The stream of ones and zeroes hit me like black rot on the cherry atop a perfectly swirled sundae: If we live in a binary world, a world of distinctions and oppositions – yes and no, good and evil, republican and democrat, in-group and out-group, living and non-living, reality and fiction, educated and uneducated, hegemonic and marginalized, same and other – how are we to ever find unity? In Epistemology we learned that the process of judgment must entail division, that is, for one to know what something is, one must gradually become aware of what it is not. How then are we to capture the spirit of reality as it is, with nothing to differentiate it against? Must the mind, in the words of Martin Heidegger, think against its essence when seeking out an absolute unity?

From the standpoint of the thinking of distinctions, unitary thinking is foolish. If we do not make a distinction between yes and no, good and evil, what actions then? To whence do we move? The fork in the road begs the distinction of left and right. Moving on, the distinction of yesterday and tomorrow. Yes is not no, good is not evil. Only the distinction of such from not-such allows it to be known, as episteme, that is for it to be crystallized into a concept, differentiated from others, available for the mind to judge.

But from the standpoint of unitary thinking, thinking of distinctions is errant. For when one draws poles apart in clear lines, one loses the richness of reality. A pen as merely a pen is deprived of many non-pen elements - poetic expression, freedom, posterity - elements that the reality of the pen evokes but the concept does not. Ascribing to the killing of innocents the category of "evil" denies the intelligibility of moments wherein one must consider the death of innocents to preserve a greater good. Precisely, reality cannot be conceived in clear lines, and drawing out conceptualizations as such leads to naught but dessication.

This leads us to a paradox of thinking: distinction and unification, distinction versus unification. Salvation from the endless bickering of opposites lies in being able to see such contradictories from a common ground that bears and bares the possibility of both unfolding as contradictories. On what ground do distinction and unification emerge? Wonder. For any such to come forth as such, and for such to come forth as not not-such, there is a necessity for a preliminary openness to reality, an allowance for the coming forth of things. But "wonder," grasped as the ground in which distinction and unification are both one and contradictory, must be seen as more than merely the openness that precedes distinction and unification. Wonder must be seen that which permeates the very act of distinction and unification, and as something that is both fully distinctive and unifying.

From this common ground of wonder, we see the essential relationship of distinction and unification. We said above "distinction and unification, distinction versus unification." This oppositional togetherness seen in the possibility of substituting and for versus is now allowed another substitution: Qua, that is "in so far as; in the capacity or character of." Distinction qua unification, unification qua distinction. On the common ground of wonder, we see the emergence of the possibility of the qua relationship. When seen from the standpoint of wonder, distinction is seen in the capacity of unification, such that the division in conceptualization emerges from the possibility of the such and the not-such it is distinguished from, conversing on the same originary plane. Unification as well is seen in the capacity of distinction, such that the reconciled depth in unity becomes possible only in that the reconciled elements span reality in their opposition.

In the dialectical qua relationship, we see a unification of absolute contradictories. On first glance, it appears that the qua relationship is a relationship of unification. Such an appearance is not wrong, but it is not correct either. Precisely, such a relationship is both distinctively an act of unification and distinction. It unites the paradox from the standpoint of their common ground, but at the same time it summons forth the inherent opposition within the paradox. As seen in the example above, of wonder being the common ground wherein distinction and unification occur, the difference of the latter two is still preserved. Distinction and unification remain shown forth in their contradictory nature. However, their mere difference has been transcended, as we descended to their common unifying ground. Precisely, the qua relationship reveals the locus, the common ground wherein the emergence of difference becomes possible.

Why this foray into the qua relationship? Why the inordinate detour into such and its relationship with the paradox of unification and distinction? The reason for such is, this qua relationship and seeing the common ground of paradoxes summon forth the essence of philosophy as I see it. This may be a little difficult to justify. Let me attempt to do so by rending apart philosophy into is root words: philein and sophon. Philein is to love, and in the case of philosophy, it is to love something that is not possessed in its entirety and is hence orexis, a striving. Sophon is translated as wisdom. In "What is Philosophy?" Heidegger brings forth another sense of sophon: Hen Panta, One is All. In this sense, philosophy is a loving/striving for wisdom, the One is All.

We have arrived at two pairs of paradoxes. First, philosophy is a loving of what is intrinsic, and at the same time a striving for something one cannot attain in completion. Second, philosophy concerns itself with a wisdom that is of "One is All."

The first paradox has to do with the relationship of philosophy to the nature of man. Philein in this sense is first a love, that is, sophon must be available, present for man to love. Therefore for philosophy to be possible, the wisdom of "one is all" must be intrinsically available to man. But the philein is not a love that is in completion, that is, what it seeks (in completion) is lost to it. The wisdom of "one is all" is inherently forgotten. Therefore philein is also striving, orexis. On what ground is philein possible as both a love of the inherent and the striving of what is lost to us in its entirety? The locus for commonality, of love qua orexis and orexis qua love is the question: "What is Man?"

The paradox of philein qua orexis and orexis qua philein surely reveals its ground as a movement of man. As that which is done by man as a movement toward sophon, philein and orexis can be seen palpably as one. But what is this movement of man to sophon? Do we have a word that reveals a movement that is either and exhaustively philein and orexis, a word that can contain a love of the present that is at the same time a striving for the lost? This is one distinct facet of philosophy, the seeking of an explication of this movement of man toward an understanding of reality as "one and all."

In Being and Time, Heidegger seeks out an answer to this question of man. Here, he presents to us Da-sein as the essential character of man. Man is not merely a being, as Da-sein it is a peculiar sort, which as Heidegger says, is a being concerned about its very being. Da-sein is ontological. As we see, in such that we humans are Da-sein, we bear the possibility of having Being (on) come forth in explication (logos). In our very being, we are in a state of openness to Being. Openness is one way of seeing the locus of the paradox of philein/orexis. Openness as Da-sein means that there is a possibility of explicating Being, but as Da-sein is still a being in itself, then as such it belongs to Being, and Being does not belong to it.

The play of the finitude of man (as a being) and the infinite essential openness of man (as ontological) reveals itself in other studies in the philosophy of man. "What is Man?" is sought out through the concepts of sociality and historicity, that reckon with man’s finitude as a situated member amongst people and history, and man’s infinity as a contributing locus of information in an endlessly rippling network in space and time. In all philosophies of man, we attempt to gain an understanding of man as finite qua infinite and infinite qua finite, expressing and explicating his paradoxical movement toward reality as seen in philein qua orexis and orexis qua philein.

What then with the second paradox, what does it mean that "One is All?" Does it seek out the One, in that it is all? Or does it seek all, in that it is one? We return to the question of the knowledge of distinction and unification, but now it acquires yet another sense, which is the sense of the reality that is known. Stated clearly, reality is both one, unified and whole, but is at the same time all, each and everything with its own uniqueness and differences. The locus for unity qua multiplicity, multiplicity qua unity is the question: "What is?" It is the question of reality itself, such that it is both One and All.

Reality as a paradox of unity and multiplicity is sought in various philosophical disciplines such as metaphysics, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and philosophy of religion. In these disciplines, we all have the play between the absolute and the relative, the unity and the multitude. The absolute can be approached as Being/Nothing (as in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism), God (theism) or both (panentheism, Thomistic Metaphysics). To these absolutes, we have those which are relative: beings, and ens creatum (created beings). Through the aformentioned philosophical disciplines, we seek to understand how reality is at the same time a multitude of beings, all different and unique, but at the same time reality coheres as a whole, as one. This is as Fr. Norris Clarke puts it:

As seen in Clarke’s work, various methods attempt to resolve this paradox in either direction. Radical and Mitigated Monism resolve the paradox of one and many in the left-hand direction, denying multiplicity and diversity in favor of the "one." Radical Pluralism and Mitigated Pluralism do the reverse, resolving the paradox in the right-hand direction, denying unity as a mere abstraction. I believe Heidegger’s solution rings truest to my conception of philosophy and reality. Clarke classifies Heidegger’s solution as a Participation Doctrine, a doctrine that acknowledges fully both the unity and the multiplicity of reality. However, as Clarke acknowledges, Heidegger is different in that the locus of unity, Being, is not a being in itself. Being is only the Being of beings, it does not have a ground of its own. Hence, Heidegger is less likely to conscript beings to a telos of Being, as Being, despite its reliability, is a non-ground. Such further respects the multiplicity of beings despite their total dependence on Being, and more fully embraces the contradiction within the terms "one" and "many." But personal preferences aside, all thinking within metaphysics and transcending metaphysics (as Heidegger’s fundamental ontology), as well as all thinking of absolutes (Being, God, Good) and their relation to the relatives of this world, as in philosophy of religion, grapple with the paradox of one qua many, many qua one.

Therefore the word philosophy has two immediate paradoxes: the paradox of love and striving, and the paradox of unity and multiplicity. Two questions arise from philein and sophon respectively: first is the question of man and his orientation to reality. Second is the question of reality and its united multiplicity. A third question becomes possible here. If philein raises the question of man and his orientation, and sophon raises the question of Being and reality, philosophia as a whole raises the question of man and Being.

This third question is more than just a reiteration of the first question. The first question merely seeks the locus of the possibility that reality is both available to and beyond man. The third question asks: if man is oriented to reality in an openness that reckons with both reality's availability and beyondness, what then? The third question seeks an explication of the call of what is to the being that asks "what is." Given man and his nature, and reality and its understanding, what is man called to do? This is ethics in the most primordial sense of comportment. This is the existential demand placed by reality upon man.

Before directly tackling ethics, we tackle the question of a pre-ethical comportment as seen in Heidegger’s work. Through the openness of man to Being as Da-sein, man is compelled to comport himself in a particular manner toward beings, such that Da-sein "lets beings be." Hölderlin says, "poetically man dwells upon the earth." In our existence as Da-sein, we are compelled to dwell in a manner that is true to our essence by allowing things to come forth (poiésis) as they are. Poetic dwelling thus constitutes a pre-ethical imperative of our essential nature as Da-sein, as is commanded by reality itself.

An outright ethics emerges clearly in the dialogues of Plato. We see through the mouth of Socrates that one cannot be pious unless one truly understands what piety is. One cannot be virtuous unless one truly understands the nature of virtue. To be good, one must know the good. Hence man’s openness to reality bears not only the possibility of knowledge but the possibility of ethics. Man’s openness to reality allows him the capacity to do what reality calls of him.

What is philosophy? Etymologically analyzed, philosophia is philein and sophon. In its two root words, three paradoxes arise. Philein summons forth the paradox of love and striving. Sophon summons forth the paradox of unity and multiplicity. Together, philosophia summons forth the paradox of man and Being. From these three paradoxes, seeking into the ground such that each contradictory can be seen qua its contradictory, reveals an ontological absolute, a locus that becomes ground for a question. Hence we are left with three questions: The question of Man, the question of Being, and the question of the comportment of Man to Being. These three questions plot the course of philosophy, from epistemology to ontology to ethics and so on.

What then does it mean to philosophize? To philosophize means to seek for the essence of man, the reality of which man is called to speak, and the call of reality to man that goes beyond the speaking. To philosophize means to immerse one’s self into the paradoxes of philosophy and seek out the unity in its absolute contradictories. To philosophize means to be as humans are called by reality to be, and to do so as critically and rigorously as possible. As a synthesis of paradoxes, philosophy is perhaps incapable of every grasping what it seeks fully. But as one puts down this paper, ceases reading, and goes on through life, perhaps one shall live with more open eyes (and more furrowed brows), knowing that life is philosophical and our quest is not made vain by the elusiveness of our goals, but is instead honored by the very questing of us philosophers, the questors.

• Vincent G. Potter, On Understanding Understanding (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994).
• Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" in Pathmarks; edited by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
• Martin Heidegger, "What is Philosophy?" in the Ph101 Compilation of Lovelyn Corpuz (for Ateneo de Manila University, 2002).
• W. Norris Clarke,S.J., Central Problems of Metaphysics; edited by Nemesio S. Que, S.J. (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 2001).
• Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts; translated by Gary E. Aylesworth (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993).
• Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings; edited by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).